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Abstract Neurobiological and behavioural genetic research gives rise to speculations about
potential biomedical interventions to prevent, contain, or treat violent and antisocial behaviour.
These developments have stirred considerable ethical debate on the prospects, threats, and limi-
tations of integrating neurobiological and behavioural genetic interventions in forensic psychiatric
practices, yet little is known about how forensic practitioners perceive these potential interventions.
We conducted a qualitative study to examine (i) the extent to which forensic practitioners expect
that effective biomedical interventions will be developed and integrated in their daily work practice
and (ii) their normative views concerning those potential biomedically informed interventions. We
focused on potential biomedical possibilities to lower aggression, the possible usage of neu-
roimaging in assessing legal responsibility, and the potential use of biomarkers in assessing risk for
future violent and antisocial behaviour. Forensic practitioners expect novel biomedical interventions
to be developed and display a general openness towards them. At the same time, they express
concern that the integration of neurobiological and behavioural genetic elements in explanatory
models of violence and antisocial behaviour may lead to misinterpretations, especially when
implemented in the forensic field.
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Introduction
Scientific developments in neurobiology and behavioural genetics give rise to speculations
about potential biomedical interventions to prevent, contain, or treat violent and antisocial
behaviour (Eichelberger and Barnes, 2015; Fozdar, 2016; Glenn and Raine, 2014; van der
Gronde et al, 2014; Lee, 2015; de Ridder et al, 2009; Rocque et al, 2012). These potential
developments have stirred considerable ethical debate on the prospects, threats, and
limitations of integrating neurobiological and behavioural genetic interventions in forensic
psychiatric practices (Chhangur et al, 2015; Horstko¨tter, 2015; Hu¨bner and White, 2016;
Munthe and Radovic, 2015; Pustilnik, 2009; Rose, 2000; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013).
In this study, we intend to broaden the ethical debate by asking how practitioners in
forensic mental health contexts (both forensic psychiatrists and clinical psychologists and
therapists) view these potential interventions. Do they expect that effective biomedical
interventions aimed at preventing, containing, and treating violent and antisocial behaviour
will be developed? How do they normatively view the potential integration of such
interventions within current treatment practices? For the present study, we interviewed
forensic practitioners about their expectations as well as moral views regarding potential
applications of current neurobiological and behavioural genetic research aiming to
understand (and possibly help prevent, contain, or treat) violent and antisocial behaviour.
An earlier study asked people who are professionally engaged in the criminal justice
system and who work with young people and families judged to be ‘at risk’ of criminal or
antisocial behaviour about their views on the causes of violent and antisocial behaviour,
their response to the idea of a genetic susceptibility to aggressive behaviour, and possible
implications for their own work (Pieri and Levitt, 2008). Other studies explored the views of
juveniles in juvenile justice institutions on biological explanations of antisocial behaviour
(Horstko¨tter et al, 2014b) and the views of parents and (non-forensic) healthcare
professionals (genetic professionals and paediatricians) on genetic tests for violent behaviour
(Campbell and Ross, 2004). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first interview study to
probe the normative views of forensic mental health practitioners concerning potential
future biomedical interventions for forensic patients and offenders with mental health issues.
We first asked forensic practitioners, with reference to their role in treating forensic
patients and offenders with mental health issues, about their expectations regarding
potential future biomedical possibilities to lower aggression. Current research on the
neurobiology and (epi)genetics of aggression may inform new treatments for pathological,
maladaptive, or antisocial aggressive behaviour (Asherson and Cormand, 2016). Aggressive
behaviours are often partially refractory to medication (Gurnani et al, 2016; Raine, 2013;
Temel et al, 2016). Research on novel medications and neuro-stimulation may provide new
ways to deal with aggressive behaviours. Non-invasive interventions may involve biofeed-
back, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and transcranial direct current stimulation. More
invasive potential interventions such as deep brain stimulation involve electrical stimulation
of the brain through electrode implants (Temel et al, 2016).
Second, with respect to forensic practitioners’ role as court-appointed experts, we probed
their views on the possible uses of neuroimaging in assessing legal responsibility within court
settings. Further developments in neuroimaging research may be used in criminal justice
settings to inform forensic psychiatric and neurological expert reports (Witzel et al, 2008).
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Currently, the use of structural or functional brain images in court is more widespread in US
courts as compared to European courts and it is mostly limited to the sentencing phase to
acquire sentence mitigation (Ginther, 2016; de Kogel and Westgeest, 2015; McSwiggan et al,
2017; Morse, 2016). Future usage of brain imaging in court settings may involve establishing
the presence or absence of psychiatric or neurological disorders (Roskies et al, 2013) and
scientifically assessing intentionality, degrees of legal responsibility, or recidivism risk
(Aharoni et al, 2008).
Finally, with relation to their role in prevention and public protection, we asked them
about their views concerning the possibilities and desirability of early detection and
intervention based on biomarkers. Preliminary research is underway to determine which
biomarkers – genetic, neurobiological, and physiological – might give accurate risk
assessments of future violent and antisocial behaviour and which preventive interventions
would be effective in reducing those risks (Gaudet et al, 2016; Glenn and Raine, 2014; Glenn
et al, 2015; Liu, 2011; van Goozen and Fairchild, 2008; Rocque et al, 2012; Singh et al,
2013; Singh and Rose, 2009). Other uses of biomarkers that are being investigated are
biological predictors of inpatient violence, length of stay, and reoffending (Aharoni et al,
2013; Sedgwick et al, 2016).
Methods
Sample and recruitment
We recruited 18 forensic practitioners (forensic psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and
therapists) in the Netherlands and in Belgium. Subjects were recruited via professional
organisations and by snowballing, and were not incentivised. Our sample consists of seven
females and 11 males, ranging in age from 32 to 68 years. At the time of the interviews, nine
participants were employed in the Netherlands and nine participants were employed in
Belgium.
We conducted eight interviews with forensic psychiatrists (FP) (at the time of the
interview, one participant worked as a general psychiatrist, but had worked in forensic
settings in the past). We conducted 10 interviews with clinical psychologists (CP) or
therapists (T) (at the time of the interview, one participant – a therapist – was primarily
involved in research and did not consult patients, but had done so in the past). Ten
participants (five psychiatrists and five psychologists) are involved in scientific research,
alongside their clinical or therapeutic work.
Qualitative interviews
Participants took part in an individual semi-structured interview lasting approximately 1 h.
During one interview, two respondents were present and interviewed together. The
interviews were held in Belgium and the Netherlands, and took place between July 2015 and
July 2016. The interviews were conducted by JS, FF, and MS. JS attended 14 interviews, FF
attended seven interviews, and MS attended one interview.
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The interview schedule included open-ended questions about participants’ expectations
towards and normative views on the following: potential future options for treating
aggression; potential usage of neuroimaging in determining legal responsibility within court
settings; and the question as to whether insight into the neurobiological and biosocial
predictors of criminal behaviour might broaden opportunities for early detection and
prevention of children and adolescents who might be considered at risk of future violent or
antisocial behaviour. As forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, and psychiatrists and
psychologists in general, are trained to understand and treat human behaviour from a
medical and/or healthcare perspective, and faced with the many variations that may exist
between people, with respect to both non-deviant and deviant behaviour on a daily basis, we
expected to receive highly nuanced and diverse responses to our questions.
In addition to the open-ended questions, the interview schedule contained a number of
examples (prompts) to enable the interviewer to gain a more detailed answer. For example,
regarding potential future options for treating aggression, we would add: ‘‘One might well
look at interventions such as TMS, DBS, or potential new pharmacological interventions.
Do you expect interventions such as these to find entrance in your professional practice?’’ In
this paper, we report on our findings and discuss possible ethical implications.
Coding
All interviews were conducted in Dutch, audio-recorded, and transcribed verbatim.
Interviews were coded in QSR NVivo version 10 using descriptive theme analysis (Bazeley
and Jackson, 2013). Because our methodological orientation was content analysis, and our
research was not hypothesis-driven but data-driven, we aimed at exploring the broad, varied
perspectives and meanings that participants hold (Creswell, 2013; Tong et al, 2007).
All transcripts were independently read by all members of the research team (JS, FF,MS, SS)
and discussedwith the purpose of drafting a preliminary analytic framework. JS independently
coded the transcripts by labelling sections and text units referring to one or multiple concepts
relevant for the study purpose. An iterative approach was used in which new data that
challenged the existing coding structure were used to revise the themes until no new themes
emerged. Interpretative bias of datawas avoided bymeans of investigator triangulation,which
involved all researchers checking the codes for consistency. Two researchers (FF and MS)
independently coded three transcripts and compared their coding and categorisingwith that of
JS. Illustrative quotes that were included in the results section were translated by JS. All
members of the research team checked the translations for accuracy.
Results
Aggression
Do forensic practitioners expect that effective biomedical interventions to lower aggression
will be developed, and how do they morally view those potential interventions? A large
majority of participants expect that novel interventions will be developed. At the same time,
however, nearly all participants stress that violent and antisocial behaviour can have many
different (kinds of) causes, that at present there is lack of fundamental knowledge, and that
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no simple, mono-causal model of aggression is (and will be) available. In view of this
complexity, several participants question the effectiveness of one single (biomedical)
intervention and urge for an approach combining biomedical and psychosocial interventions
instead. Forensic practitioners’ moral views of potential biomedical interventions are quite
diverse and range from outright rejection, to cautious embracement, and more positive and
welcoming attitudes.
Complexity of aggression
Before offering an opinion on potential neurobiological and genetic interventions for
treating aggression, nearly all participants discuss at length the considerable difficulty of
formulating a correct and comprehensive model of aggression. Forensic psychiatrists
particularly tend to emphasise the importance of accurate diagnosis, of understanding
different types of aggression (e.g. recurring and constant, or incidental, premeditated or
impulsive), and of unravelling possible associations with mental or personality disorders,
intellectual disability, and addiction and substance abuse. This can be illustrated with the
following quote from a participant:
Apparently, with compulsive behaviours, behaviour regulation can be influenced on a
fundamental level. With aggression, we need to ask, is it constant or incidental?
Oftentimes, it is incidental and triggered in a specific situation. That is different from,
for example, OCD, which is more or less permanent. (FP4)
Many participants emphasise the current absence of a comprehensive explanatory model of
aggression. One example of a knowledge gap that is often mentioned is the lack of
understanding of the relation between psychiatric disorders and (aggressive, deviant)
behaviour.
We know very little about the relationship, the causal link between disorders and
behaviour. This applies to problems as we observe them and as we now classify them
according to the DSM – let alone how that plays out physiologically. […] You can look
at a brain, and you can say, ‘well, maybe those neural pathways are less developed, or
that lobe is a bit smaller or bigger’ – but by saying that, you have not explained why
someone is aggressive. Not everyone who has that brain-abnormality is aggressive. The
reverse does not apply either. We are still very far from being able to intervene and
remedy it [aggression]. (T1)
If I try to understand how different factors interact, the only fair answer is that we do
not know. We know a number of codetermining factors, but we have no idea how they
relate to each other, how they might reinforce, stop, trigger other factors, set up a
cascade or not. We do not understand why many people in spite of these factors
continue to develop in a healthy and well-behaved way. (CP3)
Most participants (forensic psychiatrists as well as psychologists) discuss the ways in which
societal norms and definitions of aggression differ and the ways in which aggression is often
dependent on personal and social circumstances. Many participants stress that neither our
understanding of aggression nor potential interventions to counter aggression should focus
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exclusively on either individual or environmental factors, but that, instead, both should be
taken into account.
A general trend can be observed towards intervening at the biological or somatic level.
We see this for example in sexual offenders, in a quite rigorous way. This entails a risk
of taking a fairly one-sided approach. With aggression, it might be that treatment will
develop in the same direction. Although I have yet to see if that would be possible as
specifically as with sexual disorders. (FP6)
A number of participants identify barriers to the introduction of biomedical interventions,
such as the need to build consensus and support among professionals with diverse
disciplinary backgrounds, who work from within different paradigms. Some participants
mention that, historically, research in forensic populations has not been a priority.
Once you enter prison, you find yourself in a criminal justice context. Here, medicine
stops, and research stops as well. That really struck me. It is an interesting, special
pathology that you do not see in regular medicine. Yet hardly any research is
conducted there. (FP2)
Aggression: Moral views
Several participants refer to the harmful side effects of many current (typically pharmaco-
logical) biomedical interventions and their negative impact on treatment adherence. Some
participants express the hope that future biomedical interventions will have fewer side
effects. Others, however, are concerned that interventions must be highly invasive in order to
counter aggression effectively.
I think to do this, for this to be really effective, I feel the interference with brain
function needs to be so high impact, that things such as identity and personal
performance would become radically standardised. (CP3)
Some participants express the concern that wider opportunities to intervene will instigate
less tolerance towards deviant traits or towards acting out (both in society at large and in
forensic contexts). They stress that deviant or seemingly unwanted traits (such as those
associated with psychopathy) can be advantageous in some contexts, and that altering ‘bad
traits’ or enhancing ‘good traits’ could have unforeseen and unwanted consequences (e.g. too
much empathy).
Several participants question whether potential interventions may be mandatory (for
example as a precondition for rehabilitation). Many stress the importance of voluntariness
and proper informed consent procedures, even if – as a number of participants discussed –
treatment in forensic contexts may often involve coercive offers. A number of participants
speculate on how future biomedical interventions may offer options for patients who
currently are considered treatment refractory, yet at the same time argue that invasive
interventions should preferably (or only) be offered as a last resort.
The more invasive and irreversible it is, the longer you should wait to consider it, I
think. However, it need not be ruled out completely. (CP1)
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Several participants prefer alternative, less invasive ways to limit aggressive behaviours and
promote impulse control and self-regulation, e.g. cameras, gaming, apps, electronic
monitoring, virtual reality training, etc.
Several participants discuss whether biomedical interventions would render the subject’s
role in treatment too passive. Some participants feel that passivity in this context is morally
problematic in itself, for example because biomedical treatments tend not to consider the
reasons why someone engaged in aggressive behaviour, or because they feel treatment should
focus on enhancing a patient’s capacity to manage herself or on fostering self-awareness and
self-knowledge. Others are worried that passivity would reduce the treatment’s long-term
effectiveness, for example because they expect the aggression-reducing effects to last only as
long as the intervention is given.
Neuroimaging in the courtroom
Will enhanced options for neuroimaging improve the identification of criminal responsibil-
ity? Expectations vary widely; some participants indicate that they indeed expect that
developments in neuroimaging will be rapid, and that neuroimaging will be used more often
in court settings, while others situate such options in the distant future. By and large, most
participants were highly skeptical of its potential effectiveness and mentioned numerous
moral concerns regarding its implementation.
Neuroimaging in the courtroom: Confrontation of legal and medical
terminology
Also on this issue, many participants reflect on the conceptual framework before going into
the expected use and moral desirability of using neuroimaging to assess legal responsibility.
Several participants mention the difficulties associated with operationalising responsibility,
which is essentially a legal and not a medical concept, and argue that legal concepts fall
outside of their expertise as forensic practitioners. Some even indicate that they feel they
should not say anything at all on this issue.
The whole concept of legal responsibility is almost a philosophical concept. As
psychiatrists, and behavioural experts in general, we are limited in what we can say
about it. (FP6)
Some problematise the concept of legal responsibility itself and express a preference for a
system in which forensic risk assessment instead of assessment of legal responsibility
determines whether someone is referred to prison, treatment, or both.
Neuroimaging in the courtroom: Moral views
Many participants are concerned that imaging data will be misinterpreted and oversimpli-
fied. They refer to the difficulty of correctly interpreting neuroimaging results and the lack of
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expertise of, for example, judges or juries. They talk about the power of images and the
illusionary appearance of objectivity they might convey. They discuss the false sense of
security neuroimaging might offer, and how this might negatively impact legal processes.
At one point, the image starts to determine who someone is, well, yes almost
determining who someone is. And therefore also, how far his responsibilities, to what
extent he is responsible for his behaviour. (…) I even think it’s a risky development,
because it claims that it can classify people very precisely. And taking into account the
ways things tend to go in the confrontation between behavioural experts and the
judiciary, the behavioural expert suddenly pretends to hold the truth. And if you’re not
careful, the judiciary will go along with that. (FP6)
Some participants are concerned that the use of neuroimaging results would reinforce ideas
of incorrigibility, of ‘violent brains’, ‘born criminals’, or ‘born monsters’ who differ
fundamentally from normal people, thus underestimating plasticity and individual adapt-
ability and undermining ideas of individual agency and responsibility.
Several participants indicate that they feel that presenting imaging data unequivocally
would fulfil a societal demand, for example because judges welcome it or because it would
make it easier for many people to tolerate and accept crime.
This man said ‘Show me a brain and I can tell you if he is a paedophile or not.’ That is
something society begs for, I think, a doctor who clearly indicates based on an image,
‘This is a paedophile and he is dangerous, he’s a predator, lock him up.’ Or ‘Remove that
part of his brain, break his skull open.’ That is something society would really welcome.
If only it would be so simple and easy to address. I think this is a serious danger. In this
regard, I feel more than a professional resistance; I think we should not go there. (CP4)
Early identification and prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour using
biomarkers
Finally, we asked participants whether insight into neurobiological and biosocial predictors
of violent and antisocial behaviour might broaden opportunities for early detection and
prevention of children and adolescents who might be considered at risk of future violent or
antisocial behaviour. All participants (except for one psychiatrist) indeed expected
biomarkers to be integrated in preventive screening programs and even considered this a
largely unstoppable development. At the same time, however, participants expressed a
strong professional resistance, discussed the substantial implications of such programs, and
mentioned a range of moral concerns.
Many participants stressed the importance of prevention rather than cure, of being able to
prevent pathology, and of intervening before people become involved with the criminal justice
system. Some expressed a particular interest in identifying extreme cases as early as possible.
The earlier we can intervene, the better. Because we often see people with such difficult
pasts and with histories of failing assistance. This is due to the person in question, but
also due to us. We do too little, or we fail to persevere. Legal frameworks also provide
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us insufficient opportunities to intervene, measures such as involuntary commitment
for example. (FP3)
Pessimism about or reluctance towards prospects of using biomarkers in early prevention
and intervention programs sprang from the following main considerations: the low
predictive value of biomarkers; the lack of feasibility of large and comprehensive screening
programs; and moral concerns about labelling and stigmatisation.
Early identification and prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour using
biomarkers: Feasibility of accurate prediction
Several participants stress difficulties associated with (or even the impossibility of) accurately
predicting risk of future violent or antisocial behaviour. For example, they assert that hardly
any direct, causal relations between physiological characteristics and future antisocial or
criminal behaviour are established.
It seems that a range of factors – that are also associated with each other – correlate with
crime. I cannot see how you could intervene solely based on physiological character-
istics. There are hardly any cases where such a one-on-one relation exists. (T1)
Of course there is always the problem that there never is a one-on-one relation, and
that all those factors that contribute to you going off track in such a way that you end
up in civil commitment, are all, single-handedly, very prevalent. (CP6)
Everyone is at risk for aggression. Because aggression is the most human thing there is.
(CP5)
Some also mention the difficulty of determining the proper moment to intervene. They
caution against intervening too early and note the problem of potential false positives and
negatives.
Several participants draw a parallel with screening and prevention programs within
general psychiatry, aimed at identifying people who are at a higher risk of experiencing
psychoses, where a large group needs to be screened and monitored in order to identify the
relatively small subgroup that is actually at risk and that could benefit from interventions.
Participants contemplate the (cost-)effectiveness of such large and comprehensive programs
and mention difficulties associated with correctly interpreting biomarkers and formulating
appropriate selection and inclusion criteria. A few participants problematise underlying
conceptions of crime, delinquency, antisocial behaviour, and violence.
Delinquency has to do with transgressing norms, which are nowhere to be found in the
brain but are defined by a social group. (CP3)
Early identification and prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour using
biomarkers: Moral views
In addition to concerns about feasibility, many participants express moral concerns
regarding early prevention and detection programs. They are worried that such programs
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would be focused primarily at preventing future crime instead of helping children or
relieving suffering, that such approaches would tend to be paternalistic and coercive in
nature, and that they would target and single out individual children as ‘risky children’.
Many participants mention and strongly reject the likely stigmatising and discriminatory
(and even self-fulfilling) effects of labelling – especially young children – as being at risk for
future antisocial behaviour.
If I need to choose between labelling and prevention, I would say that it is more
important not to label, especially young people. Labelling is based solely on risk, and
so little on opportunities and possibilities for positive development. (FP1)
Although many participants underline the importance of prevention in general, they see
important ethical differences between prevention programs aimed at precluding impaired
development of the child or individual in question and programs that focus on preventing
crime.
What you strive for, is helping children, when they are hindering themselves or others,
to develop in a positive way. Once you identify a child as a potential offender, you are
already treading on very thin ice. (FP6)
Some participants welcome biomedically informed prevention efforts, provided that they
aim to relieve current and future suffering, aid development, and offer opportunities to
develop a full life. Some participants speculate about biomarker research offering insights
into underlying factors, how such research may offer new, more precise treatment options,
and how it could be used as a source of information in treatment settings.
What I find more interesting is whether it [e.g. skin conductance] may provide
indications for doing something different than we had imagined by looking at
behaviour alone. That could give some sort of insight; ‘You have been tense for a
couple of days.’ And that this would help prevent escalation. I find that very
interesting, that you can use it as a source of information, to gain insight. (FP8)
A number of participants prefer general awareness and education campaigns (for example
about impulsiveness for all school-aged children) or (psycho) education aimed specifically at
individuals at risk:
I support everything that has to do with self-awareness and with being able to deal
with those personal characteristics that increase the likelihood of undesirable
outcomes. (CP3)
However, some participants worry that other, non-biological markers (such as social and
environmental factors) will disappear from sight, which would negatively affect the
therapeutic relationship.
I hope that it won’t become self-evident, that my job in several years will be reduced to
being confronted with a blood level and to determine on that basis which treatment to
initiate, and whether treatment should be outpatient or inpatient. I hope I will still be
able to be in contact with people. (CP4)
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Some participants situate speculation about biomedically informed early detection and
prevention programs in the context of broader societal trends, such as increased focus on
early prevention, higher societal risk aversion, and decreasing tolerance for deviance and
abnormality.
I think these issues are very topical, because much appears to be controllable. At many
levels, not only with regard to people but also in business, we assume everything
manageable. I don’t believe such malleability exists – we are keeping this illusion alive,
but it is a kind of fake truth. (FP5)
Everyone wants us to do more prevention. Authorities are asking, what should we do
with those children in the neighbourhoods? Which signals must we take seriously and
which not? When should we scale up? That has nothing to do with innovative
technology, but rather with how far we should go in actively tracking and detecting.
(FP8)
At that moment, we will have to ask what kind of society we want to live in. North
Korea will have a different perspective than European countries. If you decide as a
society that you prioritise zero-risk policy, where the collective rather than the
individual is the starting point, then I can imagine that politics will embrace such
policies. Yes, I find that prospect quite disturbing. (FP5)
Discussion
In this study, we interviewed forensic practitioners in the Netherlands and in Flanders,
Belgium about their expectations and moral views regarding potential biomedical interven-
tions to prevent, contain, or treat violent and antisocial behaviour, explicitly focusing not
only on potential efficacy but on moral desirability as well. Little is known about forensic
mental health practitioners’ perceptions of potential biomedical interventions for forensic
patients and offenders with mental health issues.
Overall, this study indicates that forensic practitioners expect novel biomedical interven-
tions to find entry in their professional practice, either because they anticipate that rapid
scientific developments will generate effective biomedical interventions, or, alternatively,
because they observe a growing (societal, professional) demand for biomedical interventions
(for example because of their perceived greater objectiveness and effectiveness as compared
to non-biomedical interventions). This is a reason why, in our analyses, we have been careful
to distinguish between four aspects: forensic practitioners’ expectations that potential new
biomedical interventions will become available; their expectations regarding the effective-
ness of these potential interventions; whether they generally welcome biomedical interven-
tions and hope new biomedical interventions will become available, or whether, on the
contrary, they fundamentally ethically reject the introduction of potential future biomedical
interventions in their professional practice.
Few forensic practitioners in our study seem to oppose biomedical interventions per se.
Yet, when discussing their potential efficacy, most forensic practitioners strongly advocate
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epistemic caution. Participants underline that mono-causal explanatory models are not
available and point to the complex (non-direct/non-causal) relations between individual
(neuro)biology, genetic susceptibilities, mental disorders, environment, SES, and violent and
antisocial behaviour. They discuss difficulties associated with correctly interpreting
neuroimaging results (see, for example, Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013) and warn that genetic
susceptibility to violence (Pieri and Levitt, 2008) and predictions based on biomarkers lack
individual predictive value (Starr, 2014).
Participants who in general welcome novel biomedical interventions anticipated or hoped
for less severe side effects than those of current (mostly pharmacological) treatments.
Moreover, they hoped that these interventions will provide insight into underlying causes of
violent and antisocial behaviour as well as increased opportunities to tailor interventions to
the individual in question (personalised medicine). Participants also expressed hope that
such interventions might provide opportunities for increased self-awareness and self-
regulation, and will make patients less dependent on contingent factors such as the
particular care provider and the preferred form of (psychosocial) therapy.
Our study reveals a mixed picture with respect to forensic practitioners’ moral concerns
about potential biomedical treatments for aggression. Major skepticism and considerable
moral concerns were expressed with regard to the use of neuroimaging in court. As to early
detection and prevention using biomarkers, these were almost entirely rejected by our
respondents.
By and large, participants seem to be aware of major ethical issues as they are being
discussed in current ethical debates on potential biomedical interventions. These are concerns
about reductionism and disregard for socio-political circumstances in case of novel treatment
options for violent and antisocial behaviour (Goldberg, 2011), the difficulty of reaching
consensus on the meaning and significance of neuroimaging in the courtroom (Aggarwal,
2009; Glannon, 2014), as well as major ethical concerns with respect to early detection and
prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour such as labelling and stigmatisation, societal
control, and undue focus on risk (compare Horstko¨tter et al, 2014a; Wolpe, 2013).
Regarding potential novel treatment options for violence and antisocial behaviour, several
participants stressed the need to obtain informed consent when offering biomedical
interventions. The legitimacy of coercion and of mandating biomedical interventions has
recently been a topic of discussion in the ethical literature as well. Interventions involving
coerced or semi-coerced drug and/or hormonal treatments that may involve very serious side
effects and affect an individual’s mental liberty are considered ethically problematic (Bublitz
and Merkel, 2014; Focquaert, 2014). However, some philosophers have recently argued that
an offender’s mental liberty or ‘freedom of thought’ is potentially equally violated by forced
incarceration practices as by forced biomedical interventions (e.g. Carter, 2016; Douglas,
2014; Petersen and Kragh, 2017). In our view, important differences exist between forcing a
biomedical intervention upon an offender and depriving an offender of the right to free
movement. Even though current incarceration practices are often ethically problematic,
incarceration does not violate an offender’s mental liberty in the same way forced neuro-
interventions can violate it, because biomedical interventions are more likely to bypass our
capacity to reflect upon the changes they bring about, and can overrule the ability to
gradually endorse, reject, or object to the alterations of our self (Focquaert and Schermer,
2015; Focquaert, 2017).
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Most direct biomedical interventions (e.g. pharmacological interventions, transcranial
magnetic stimulation, transcranial direct current stimulation) exert temporary effects and
are essentially reversible in nature. This means that the beneficial treatment effects (e.g.
symptom reduction in case of aggressive thoughts and behaviour) only last as long as one
takes the medication or gets the stimulation. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that the long-
term use of biomedical interventions can have irreversible effects on one’s cognitive–
emotional functioning, especially when the intervention is started at an early age [e.g. the use
of Ritalin for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)]. Non-invasive, indirect
biomedical interventions such as environmental enrichment and food supplements on the
other hand supposedly have lasting, positive effects on children’s brain development.
Although more invasive interventions such as deep brain stimulation are considered to have
the potential to permanently rewire the brain after long-term use as well [e.g. in case of
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD)], such findings have not been reported.
With respect to the use of neuroimaging data in court, participants in our study were
particularly concerned about mis- and overinterpretation and potential detrimental effects
on legal processes. Similar worries are voiced in a recent paper on the use of neuroscientific
evidence in Canadian criminal proceedings (Chandler, 2016). For example, an experimental
study by Aspinwall and colleagues showed that judges that are confronted with
neuroimaging data tend to impose lower sentences and list more mitigating factors
(Aspinwall et al, 2012). A recent empirical analysis examining the use of neurological and
behavioural genetic evidence in US criminal law (between 2005 and 2012) reports that
neurobiological data were most commonly used by criminal defence attorneys to mitigate
responsibility and punishment (Farahany, 2016). At the same time however, this study
showed that prosecutors have argued for higher sentences referring to ‘hard-wired’
incorrigibility or future dangerousness of perpetrators, confirming the idea that neuroimag-
ing data can function as a double-edged sword (Chandler, 2016; Aspinwall et al, 2012).
A significant added value of our study is that it shows forensic practitioners to be aware
and cautious of various misunderstandings and misrepresentations that might result from the
specific dynamics of the forensic field. These misinterpretations may arise, first, from the
ways in which scientific findings are translated to forensic psychiatric practice. Second, they
may arise when forensic practitioners interact with other legal (judges, jurors, etc.) and
political (e.g. Department of Health or Justice) professionals who operate in different
institutional frameworks (law, medicine, politics), and who may lack the expertise to
correctly interpret biomedical interventions or findings. Third and finally, in confrontation
with wider society, forensic practitioners are concerned about how biomedical interventions
will be perceived by the general public and the media (Berryessa et al, 2016). Of particular
concern is the risk that biomarkers for future violent or antisocial behaviour will reinforce
perceptions of children as at risk, or risky1 before they have actually engaged in harmful
behaviour, and the substantive negative effects of labelling and stigmatisation (Chhangur
1 ‘‘Two senses of risk are brought into alignment. The first is the desire to identify risky individuals – that is
to say, those who will present a future risk to others – before the actual harm is committed. The second is
the hope that one might be able to identify individuals at risk – those whose particular combination of
biology and life history makes them themselves susceptible to some future condition – here personality
disorder, impulsivity, aggressivity, or whatever, but more generally susceptibility for any psychiatric
disorder’’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 197).
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et al, 2015; Horstko¨tter, 2015; Levitt and Pieri, 2009; Pieri and Levitt, 2008; Rocque et al,
2012; Wasserman, 2014).
Notably, a range of ethical concerns voiced by forensic practitioners in this study may not
be exclusive to bio-interventions. Some participants even explicitly mentioned that many of
their moral concerns apply to some non-biomedically informed interventions as well:
I think dilemmas of this type apply equally to behavioural therapy for example. (FP8)
Likewise, in ethical analyses regarding early detection and prevention programs, the
argument has been made that many (but not all) objections voiced against biomedical
approaches apply to psychosocial approaches as well, and that therefore, from an ethical
point of view, ‘‘it is more important to determine how to deal responsibly with possible risks
of early detection and prevention than asking whether this is based on a social scientific, a
psychological, a biological or a mixed approach’’ (Horstko¨tter et al, 2012, p. 295;
Horstko¨tter et al, 2014a). On the other hand, our interviews suggest that forensic
practitioners think that some issues may nevertheless be more relevant to bio-interventions
(notably concerns about invasiveness, mental freedom, and irreversible or long-term side-
effects).
In conclusion, forensic practitioners mostly appear to endorse and reason based on bio-
psycho-social models of violent and antisocial behaviour. They stress that biomedical
approaches will not (or should not) make current psychosocial approaches obsolete and
that they should work in concert instead. This is consistent with current scientific literature
in which there is a growing consensus that bio-psycho-social explanatory models of violent
and antisocial behaviour are the most promising ones (Eichelberger and Barnes, 2015; Lee,
2015). Yet, our interviews show that forensic practitioners are also concerned about and
acutely aware of the fact that the integration of neurobiological and behavioural genetic
elements in explanatory models of violence and antisocial behaviour may be misinter-
preted in various ways and by various actors, especially when implemented in the forensic
field.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Because the study is qualitative and the sample size is limited, we cannot draw conclusions
about the minor differences we observed between psychiatrists and psychologists in terms of
their general openness towards potential biomedical interventions. Whereas the majority of
forensic psychiatrists demonstrated a basic openness to these developments, we observed a
more critical attitude among psychologists. Drawing a comparison between these groups
was not a central study aim, as our focus was on the expectations and moral views regarding
potential biomedical interventions of forensic practitioners generally. The differences we
observed reflect and are consistent with the various disciplinary backgrounds of forensic
practitioners, i.e. medicine in the case of forensic psychiatrists and clinical and social
psychology and criminology in the case of forensic psychologists and therapists, as well as
the slightly different institutional contexts they tend to work in. Future research might
explicitly focus on comparing expectations and moral views of different forensic
practitioners working in different institutional settings and in addition might take into
Specker et al
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account differences with respect to institutional architectures of forensic care in, for
example, European countries compared to the United States.
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